



# Pericles

Policy recommendation and improved communication tools for law enforcement and security agencies preventing violent radicalization

## Gap analysis on counter-radicalisation measures

Dominic Kudlacek, Laura Treskow, Brendan Marsh, Stephanie Fleischer, Matthew Phelps & Maja Halilovic Pastuovic

# Result Report



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Policy recommendation and improved communication tools for law enforcement and security agencies preventing violent radicalization

## Gap analysis on counter-radicalisation measures



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This report presents a gap analysis of current measures used for the prevention of violent extremism and radicalisation across European countries. It provides an overview of the various risk factors linked to radicalisation and analyses whether these have been addressed in current prevention tools. The respective gaps between radicalisation and violent extremism and its prevention are presented.

Areas of counter-radicalisation are still underdeveloped in Europe. Prevention measures targeting online-radicalisation, vulnerable groups and prison populations exist but only on a small scale. In contrast, it has been identified that prevention tools significantly target the social, moral and cultural development of young populations.

The risk factors mentioned in the report are not recognised as single triggers of radicalisation and are to some extent interlinked with one another. Counter-radicalisation and measures to curtail violent extremism should increase the development of tools and initiatives that target all pathways to radicalisation.

The report is the second of a sequence of three reports that together will produce policy recommendations for the prevention of radicalisation in Europe.

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# 1 INTRODUCTION

The increasing prevalence of radical ideologies and terrorist attacks within Europe has provided the impetus for the development of numerous tools that countries have used to help tackle extremist ideas and actions. Governments across Europe have endeavoured to explore aspects of radicalisation and violent extremism, such as the understanding of risk and motivating factors, in order to increase the effectiveness of existing preventative efforts.

Research into both radicalisation and violent extremism has also received significant funding from the European Union. Although the actual figures for total EU and member state funding are difficult to state precisely, EC funds available for counter-terrorism and radicalisation related research actions include the € 1.7 billion under Horizon 2020 for 2014-2020 funding period (European Parliament, 2015). Under such funding mechanisms, a number of research actions related to enhancing the understanding of various aspects of radicalisation and proposing tools to support LEAs and other relevant stakeholders are available. Several research projects on radicalisation, IMPACT Europe, SAFIRE and VOX-Pol to name a few, were launched under the seventh framework programme for EU research and technological development. These projects worked to create improved understandings of the underlying drivers for radicalisation, as well as technologies to assess the effectiveness of the measures developed to address radicalisation.

Despite increased efforts to prevent radicalisation and violent extremism, various practitioners and academics have outlined clear research gaps in both the knowledge of the phenomenon and the specific tools that have been developed. This report nuances several risk factors that are linked to the radicalisation process, outlining how prevention measures have responded, and discusses related gaps. Whilst counter-radicalisation measures in Europe are too extensive to be covered in sufficient detail, the report describes the various prevention actions and its gaps in accordance to the datasets in the project's first report.

The aim of this report is to provide an overview of gaps in specific areas of counter-radicalisation. Information on the measures themselves are collected from the previous report, which is based on the prevention strategies of selected European countries, specifically, Belgium, Bosnia, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Netherlands, Poland, Spain, Sweden,

Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. In the next report, interviews will be conducted with professionals in the field of counter-racialisation to further investigate whether the needs of practitioners are being addressed by current prevention measures. Together with the gaps identified in this report, an overview of future research priorities as well recommendations for re-designing current strategies will be achieved.

The report is structured into the following chapters:

- Chapter 1 outlines the methodological approach of this report, in particular the steps that were taken in order research the domains of radicalisation and violent extremism. How the data were collected is discussed, including the obstacles to the research and shortcomings of the data.
- Chapter 2 discusses the importance of the risk assessment process and its influence on radicalisation. The chapter highlights how information from a risk assessment assists in developing and selecting measures that best respond to individual needs in order to maximise the effect of prevention and minimise risks.
- Chapter 3 looks into the change in radicalisation trends pertaining to the following risk factors: internet, vulnerable groups, contact to recruitment agencies, social background, educational background and prisons. Case files of offenders are included where appropriate to demonstrate examples of how influential the factors above are in processes of radicalisation.
- Chapter 4 presents an overview of the latest counter-radicalisation measures in respect to the risk factors researched in this report. It outlines whether the factors have been sufficiently addressed by funded programmes and projects. The gaps are then highlighted to provide useful insights for policymakers and the alike in which aspects of radicalisation are actually been targeted. In turn, this will put forward a basis to in-form future intervention strategies of the advancements needed to address these fields.
- Chapter 5 summarises the gaps and reflections that can be taken to enhance future counter-radicalisation measures. Where possible, the needs of various groups are mentioned, bringing to attention a focus for future actions.



## 2 METHODOLOGY

This chapter describes the methodological approach that was used to identify respective gaps in aspects of counter-radicalisation prevention as well as how the data was collected.

### 2.1 OVERVIEW OF THE APPROACH

The report sets out to answer important questions that can be identified from the growing literature on radicalisation processes and governments' efforts on prevention in this field, namely:

1. Have vulnerabilities to radicalisation changed over time? and if so,
2. To what extent have government policies and intervention strategies addressed these transformations?

These questions were researched in two different steps. Firstly, certain risk factors of radicalisation were examined to find out whether developments have occurred in the way they enable individuals to radicalise. Secondly, an analysis of current prevention measures across Europe, based on datasets gathered on selected countries, was used to demonstrate whether these developments have been addressed.

#### 2.1.1 *Primary data collection using rubric*

For analysing documents and information about preventive measures,<sup>1</sup> a standardised instrument is necessary. The rubric has eleven pages with themes in seven different parts. Part A focused on general information about preventive measures. The second part (part B) handles the content of the project or the programme, including the aims of the measures as well as the target group. A further chapter is based on information about the target group. This section concerns the group of people the preventive measure is intended to reach. The organisational structure of the rubric takes place in part D. Concerning the methodological and the theoretical framework Part E and F are handling these themes. Part G collected information all around the scientific evaluation of preventive measures.

The collected data are set into a data set and build the basis for the results of this presented gap analysis. To identify the gap between the suite of preventive measure and the background of identified offenders in violent extremist behaviour, the collection of information about the background of

offenders is needed. In addition, the construction of a standardised scheme detailing information on offenders of terror attacks has been necessary.

### ***2.1.2 Standardised data collection instrument for identified offenders of terror attacks***

The data collection for identified offenders of terror attacks was based on publicly accessible information. Accessible information was analysed and categorised according to a number of prominent themes, including education and family background, criminal record, ideology, organisational link, nationality, migration background, and several details about the conducted attack. The identified information was organised into a data set and built the basis for a statistical analysis. In order to get into the interpretation of the results, an overview of the recent attacks in Europe is to follow this chapter.

### ***2.1.3 Obstacles to data collection***

The data collection for this report was based on a web search of identified offenders and prevention measures in the field of radicalisation and violent extremism. Information collected was limited to that collected through this methodology. As an extensive search of all possible prevention measures and terrorist related offenders was neither feasible nor appropriate for this report, we recommend further research here to identify gaps across a broader array of prevention measures.

### 3 THEORETICAL NEEDS ASSESSMENT

Needs, or risk, assessment is complex due to the wide range of terrorist and/or extremist ideologies and motivations, the varying social composition of different groups, and because of the many and varied roles within terrorist groups. Risk assessment can be defined as a “process involving the systemic gathering and interpretation of information pertaining to an individual in order to predict the likelihood that the individual will engage in the behaviour of concern” (Herrington & Roberts, 2012, as cited in Sarma, 2017, p.279). There have been a number of efforts by EU Member State Governments and EU funded research projects to improve procedures for identifying those individuals who pose a risk to societal security or are at risk of becoming involved in extremist thought and actions. This section will first outline a selection of these procedures and methodologies, as well as some of the critiques that have been offered of their effectiveness. The section will then examine an important risk factor assessment paradigm from the field of criminology, and once again cover some of the most pressing critiques of this approach. Finally, some guidelines for developing coherent and applicable risk assessment tools are offered by one expert in the field.

The UK Government Vulnerability Assessment Framework is primarily used by staff in the education and health sectors, local authorities, and youth services to help them identify individuals at risk. The system considers vulnerability on three levels:

- a. factors that promote engagement: including emotions and cognitions that leave the individual susceptible to recruitment from terrorism,
- b. intent factors that indicate readiness to use violence: including dehumanization of those targeted by terrorists,
- c. capability to cause harm: referring to individual skills and competencies and access to networks and equipment.

The Identifying Vulnerable People (IVP) system developed in UK presents a list of ‘Red Flag’ behaviours: membership of nonviolent radical groups, contact with known extremists, advanced military training, overseas combat experience, cultural and/or religious isolation, isolation from family, risk-taking behaviours, isolated peer group, hate rhetoric, political activism.

The European Union-funded Project SAFIRE developed the observable indicators of possible radicalisation guidance based on consultation with 28 individuals involved in counter-radicalization work. Twenty-one indicators are clustered under five thematic areas that are applicable to far-right as well as Islamist terrorism and radicalisation. The thematic areas are: identity and identity seeking, in-group– outgroup differentiation, pro-violence social interactions, including distancing from friends and family, change in persona, association with radicalised or extremist groups and individuals.

Sarma (2017) criticises the various guideline outlined above on three specific grounds. First, he claims that the guidelines are being non-specific about the risk being predicted. Second, there is a lack of theoretical coherence regarding the links between risk factors and terrorism, and the evidential base for identification of risk factors is underdeveloped. Finally, there is a risk of innocent individuals being categorised as being 'at risk' due to the broad and non-specific identifiers of risk.

#### *VERA: Violent Extremist Risk Assessment*

Pressman (2009) developed VERA and argues that standard violent risk assessment tools are not suitable for violent extremism. VERA is a structured professional judgement guide that includes a defined set of risk factors believed to increase the chance of future terrorism, and is therefore specifically for violent extremists.

VERA categories of risk factors (Beardsley & Beach, 2013)

- Attitude items: psychological factors relate to the motivation and ideology behind violent extremism, distinguishes terrorists from other criminals
- Contextual items: which focus on the influence of the environment and other people, which can offer support and validation of extremist beliefs
- Historical items: e.g. early experiences of violence that can increase an individual's susceptibility to terrorism
- Demographic factors: male, under 30, unmarried.

Roberts and Horgan (2008) argue that while tools such as VERA are a useful starting point, robust empirically tested needs assessment tools are urgently needed that can identify the role of Static and Dynamic Risk Factors.

**Table 1: Static and Dynamic Risk Factors**

<b>STATIC RISK FACTORS</b> (do not change over time)	<b>DYNAMIC RISK FACTORS</b> (subject to change and are, to some degree, under the control of the individual)
Nationality, ethnicity	Drug use
Childhood abuse experiences	Friendships and associations
Childhood family experiences	Emotions and perceptions favourable to radicalisation

Though not a perfect fit, there have been robust and methodologically sophisticated longitudinal studies of conventional criminal offending risk factors by criminologists that can offer some insights.

#### *The Risk Factor Prevention Paradigm*

Beginning in 1961, the Cambridge Study in Delinquent Development followed 400 males in London from age 8 to 48. Study Aims: To identify the most important risk factors in the onset and progression of offending. A risk factor is defined as a variable that predicts a high probability of offending.

#### Methodology:

- Tests administered in schools by psychologists to assess a) intelligence, b) attainment, c) personality, d) impulsivity
- Detailed qualitative interview with participants
- Parents interviewed once per year until participants were of school leaving age

Results: “The most important factors that should be targeted in intervention research are impulsiveness, school achievement, child-rearing methods, young mothers, child abuse, parental conflict, disrupted families, poverty, delinquent peers, and deprived neighbourhoods” (Farrington et al, 2012, p. 48). Offending tends to be concentrated in families: by 1993, 405 of study males were convicted, as was 28 % of their fathers, 43 % of their brothers, 12 % of their sisters, and 9% of their wives.

Remarking specifically on violent offenders, Farrington (2012) states that the following are important risk factors that should be identified in a needs

or risk assessment: Large family size, harsh parental discipline, physical abuse by a violent parent, and poor parental supervision.

Findings of the Cambridge Study in Delinquent Development were echoed by the Pittsburgh Youth Study, which followed 1500 young males for 12 years in Pittsburgh, USA (Farrington et al., 2012). Farrington (2012) concludes that both studies emphasised that far less is known about protective factors than risk factors, and risk (needs?) assessments should be designed that aim to identify protective factors in participant's lives. A protective factor is a variable that interacts with a risk factor to nullify its effects, or alternatively a variable that predicts a low probability of offending among a group at risk.

Although the Risk Factor Prevention Paradigm (RFPP) has been widely implemented in the criminal justice systems of the United Kingdom and United States, and beyond, for some time, the methodology is not without its critics. O'Mahony (2009, p.105) summarised and built upon these criticisms and argues that: "Risk-focused research on anti-social behaviour is often based on questionable measures such as self-reports or teacher, parent and peer reports, which are notoriously susceptible to subjective judgement and to the tendency either to exaggerate or deny".

O'Mahony also states that only a very small minority of people who engage in a wide range of criminal behaviour ever come to the attention of authorities and, therefore, we gain only a very limited insight into the correlates of criminal behaviour. Further, the type of crime that is the focus of RFPP is that committed by poor people and is often referred to as 'visible crime' due to the disruption it causes within communities. Corrupt businessmen and political figures, many child sex abusers and drunk drivers, for example, are often conventional, socially acceptable and well educated individuals who experience adult onset criminality and share few of the childhood risk factors the type of individuals who are the focus of the RFPP. Regarding terrorist offences, O'Mahony perceptibly argues that these crimes are often perpetrated by otherwise non-violent people who believe that their actions are morally justifiable and even heroic. While O'Mahony does in effect state that the RFPP has value and is among the best risk factor assessment tools available, he is, at the same time, severe in his criticism. O'Mahony (2009, p. 112) argues that: "The failure of risk-focused research to deal with adult onset offending, such as domestic violence and white collar crime, and its failure to acknowledge the massive scale of hidden crime and the contested nature of some crime thoroughly undermine the RFPP's claim to be identifying the correlates, let alone the causes of crime".

### *Future Advances in Risk Assessment*

In a recent important contribution to the field, and speaking from within the discipline of psychology, Sarma (2017) laments the lack of robust and evidence based risk assessment methodologies for involvement in terrorist and extremist behaviour. He offers guiding principles for consideration when reflecting on how best to develop such risk measurement tools, some of which are useful here.

Principle 1: Statistical Approaches cannot work.

Risk assessment should be carried out by an evaluator who works on an individual's case and makes a risk prediction. Such assessments can be informed by risk factors resulting from actuarial tools but must be part of a more comprehensive and holistic approach to the person.

Principle 2: Focus on Structured Judgement and Case Formulation

Evaluators work on a case-by-case basis with individuals at risk and are able to develop a coherent hypothesis regarding the link between the individuals' radicalised or extremist attitudes and social and personal factors in the person's life that may be considered risk factors.

Principle 3: Risk Assessment must involve Risk Specification

Assessments must be clear about what exactly they are trying to identify and predict, whether it be risk of involvement in terrorism or more specifically what role an individual may be likely to play once engaged in terrorist activity.

Principle 4: Harness Theories

Theories from various disciplines should be used to supplement the dearth of evidence in terrorism related studies.

Principle 5: Supervision and Training is necessary.

Evaluators and risk assessment professionals need training in order to adequately carry out their duties. Further, there should be a constant feedback and evaluation to improve practice.

## 4 TRENDS IN RECENT ATTACKS

### 4.1 INTERNET

There are growing concerns on how much impact the internet has on the radicalisation process, particularly in relation to recruitment to terrorist organisations and the spreading of extremist propaganda. These fears are based, in part, on the observation that the internet is a powerful propaganda instrument that can encourage individuals from non-violent backgrounds to engage with violent political and religious extremism. Sophisticated on-line recruitment and mobilisation propaganda produced by terrorist groups can facilitate the radicalisation of vulnerable individuals without any contact to off-line groups. Together with the easy availability of extremist material online, terrorist groups are able to foster the growth of extremist ideologies and followers but also generate contacts between affiliated groups and like-minded individuals. The section below outlines a series of case examples describing individuals for whom online radicalisation was a significant element of their descent into extremism.

#### 4.1.1 *The case of Arid Uka*

The case of the Frankfurt jihadist Arid Uka illustrates the importance of the Internet for the radicalization and recruitment of Islamic terrorists. Uka, a 21 year old Kosovar who grew up in Germany, carried out the first successful Islamic attack in Germany. On 2 March 2011, he killed two American soldiers at the Frankfurt airport and injured two others. During interrogation, Uka claimed that he was not connected to any one terrorist organisation and had become radicalised over previous months through online social networks. He claimed that he was inspired to finally act on his radical beliefs when he watched propaganda videos produced by the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IBU). In a video produced in Pakistani Waziristan that Uka watched the day before carrying out his attack, a spokesman detailed the rape of Afghan women by American soldiers and urged concerned Muslims to seek revenge against Americans. Uka told his interrogators that his actions were designed to deter future sexual attacks by American military personnel on Muslim women. As a part of his preparation for the attack, Uka repeatedly listened to jihadist battle propaganda that he accessed online, particularly the song “Mother will remain firm”.



The Uka case illustrates the potential significance of the internet in radicalisation, recruiting and mobilising young individuals. It shows that the use of media, particularly movie clips, can be persuasive and effective in evoking resentment. Further, the technical and editorial proficiency of propaganda producers increases the emotional and psychological appeal of the videos message. Film sequences depicting true events, regardless of how distorted the facts or narrative, can appeal to individuals tendencies to protect their in-groups (Steinberg, 2012). Further, the motivational power of 'battle songs' that appeal to the very identity of the individual is evident in Uka's case.

#### **4.1.2 The case of Abdul Basheer**

Abdul Basheer was a 28-year-old Singaporean lawyer and polytechnic lecturer. Abdul became "self-radicalised" through radical Islamic content on the internet. His case reinforces the finding that individuals can be vulnerable to radicalisation regardless of social status or educational attainment (Berrebi, 2007). Although his motives for leaving a successful career to pursue Jihadism are somewhat unclear, Abdul Basheer was on a quest to develop and establish a sense of religious identity. Through his search for religious and spiritual meaning he encountered radical Islamic beliefs. Basheer's case highlights the potential vulnerability to radicalisation of those individuals who are on genuine and personal mission to increase their dedication to their chosen faith. The prevalence of toxic and extremist propaganda on the internet can have a profound impact on individuals such as Basheer.

#### **4.1.3 The case of Abdul Benbrika**

The internet has been used to distribute instructions for making and using bombs and other weapons. In Australia, the radical Islamic cleric Abdul Benbrika was jailed for both organising attacks and also distributing instructional material via the web. At the turn of the millennium prospective bomb makers were often required to travel to terrorist training camps in countries like Afghanistan to receive instructions. Contemporary terrorists, however, can receive effective and sophisticated explosives instructions through forums and E-learning courses (Stenersen, 2013). This is a cause for grave concern as bomb attacks are the preeminent method of violent perpetration used by terrorists worldwide (Spaaij, 2010). Jihadists and lone wolf attackers can take advantage of available material and instructions without excursion to conflict areas.

## 4.2 VULNERABLE GROUPS

### 4.2.1 Results BKA survey about departees

Research results demonstrate that young adults are a particularly vulnerable group concerning radicalisation (Bundeskriminalamt [BKA], Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz [BfV] & Hessisches Informations- und Kompetenzzentrum gegen Extremismus [HKE], 2015; Vidino & Hughes, 2015). The search for identity, community and togetherness seem to be driving factors (Angus, 2016). The Federal Criminal Investigation (BKA) in Germany published results of an analysis about reasons and courses of radicalisation. The report focused on people who were ready to leave Germany to travel to Syria or Iraq to fight for ISIS (BKA, BfV & HKE, 2015).

Results demonstrate that mainly young men in the 18 to 30 age bracket are radicalised and ready to leave Germany to fight for ISIS. Nevertheless, young women (21 %) are also interested in leaving Germany. Slightly less than 2/3 have a migration background, 36 % of these radicalised individuals have a higher educational background (the German Abitur) and 24 % have a middle school graduate (the German Realschulabschluss). Further, 8 % of the relevant group does not have any qualification.

The publicly accessible information about identified offenders of terrorist attacks of the previous years in Europe show a similar picture. Radicalised and violent individuals – regardless of their ideology or extremist attitude – are/were youth or young adults:

- Safia Schmitter, a 15 year old girl who at the age of 8 had already contact with ISIS recruiters. In 2016, she attacked a police officer in Hannover, Germany. Her mother is from Morocco. She is a pupil in the German Gymnasium (similar with highschool) (Ramelsberger, 2016).
- Anis Ben Othman Amri was born in 1992 in Tunisia. He attacked a German Christmas market with a truck in Berlin on the 19th of December (Biermann et al., 2016).
- The brothers Ibrahim and Khalid El Bakraoui (29 years and 27 years) attacked the metro and the airport in Brussels (“Ibrahim and Khalid el-Bakraoui: From Bank Robbers to Brussels Bombers,” 2016).
- Salman Abedi (was born in 1994) perpetrated a suicide bomb attack against a concert of Ariana Grande in Manchester, England. The 22 years old man had contacts with a terrorist network and he was

known as an extremist (“Das ist über den mutmaßlichen Attentäter von Manchester bekannt,” 2017).

#### **4.2.2 Permission Status**

Needless to say, sacrificing one’s home country and community to travel to another country, often under pain of death, is a traumatic and harrowing experience for many migrants. Therefore, many migrants have expectations of their host country and unfortunately these expectations are not always met or realistic. Experiences of discrimination and exclusion, and difficulties with integration, can increase the individual’s identification with their ethnic or religious group and potentially make them susceptible to radicalised elements (Angus, 2016)

In the following cases from Germany, the migrant’s application for permission to stay were declined.

- Riaz Khan Ahmadzai was a 17 year old Syrian teenager, who arrived to Germany and sought asylum (Lohse & Wehner, 2016), however his attempts to gain asylum were unsuccessful. He sympathised with ISIS Ideologies and used an axe to attack passengers in a train near Würzburg. He was shot dead by police during their operation.
- Mohammad Daleel (27 years) was a suicide bomber who attacked a music festival in Ansbach (Bavaria). He was seeking for refuge in Germany and in 2014 he applied for residency. He unsuccessfully fought against his deportation to Bulgaria and was due to be deported a few weeks after his suicide attack on 24th of July in 2016 (Diehl & Sydow, 2016).
- Ahmad A. (26 years) was already identified as an Islamic sympathiser. He attacked eight people in a supermarket in Hamburg-Barmbek; one of the victims died. He was already in contact with the police and authorities of Protection of the Constitution (Verfassungsschutz) in Germany. Ahmad A. did not have permission to stay in Germany (“Ahmad A. soll Lkw-Attentat erwogen haben”, 2017).
- Raed Jaser (35 years) is from the United Arab Emirates and came to Germany in the 1990s. Together with his parents, he applied for asylum in Germany. The application was declined. His family and Raed Jaser lived there for two years. They felt excluded and discriminated. The whole family left Germany and arrived in Canada, where their applied for asylum were not accepted again. Raed Jaser were arrested before he could carry out an attack on a long-distance train (Michel, 2013).

- Anis Amri came from Tunisia to Germany. He was registered as a refugee in Italy and later arrived in Germany with forged papers. He was described as a frustrated man with a lot of anger towards German authorities. He attended several different mosques (between Hildesheim and Dortmund), and had become a prayer leader. On 19th of December, Anis Amri attacked the Christmas Market in Berlin with a truck (Amjahid et al., 2017). He killed 12 people, 55 were injured.

#### **4.2.3 Traumatic experiences**

Ferguson and Brinks (2015) state that 'witnessing violence against family and friends or the wider group individual identifies with, directly indirectly or vicariously could suggest that exposure to these events may cause trauma and possibly Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD)'. Indeed, feelings of separation and exclusion can result from such trauma and can partially explain why people who have experience such devastating events are later attracted to radical causes.

In the case of Raed Jaser, the family experienced several traumatic events, which could provide a partial explanation for Jaser's plan to attack a train (Via Rail) in Canada.

- Raed Jaser and his family migrated from the United Arab Emirates to Europe in 1991. The family felt discriminated and excluded from the German society and were victims of different right-wing attacks. In Germany, they were afraid for their lives when they experienced an attack with Molotov cocktails against their apartment. That's why the family migrated to Canada two years later in 1993. The family described the experiences in Germany as traumatic (Michel, 2013).
- Michael Oluwatobi Adebowale (22 years) attacked British Army Soldier Lee Rigby in Woolwich, London. Adebowale and Michael Adebolajo attacked Rigby with a knife and a meat cleaver. Sometime before, he was a witness to the murder of his friend Faridon Alizada. He was diagnosed by with a post-traumatic stress disorder. Furthermore, he had a bad mental health because of hearing voices and delusions. He left his family after the murder of his friend and when he came back to his family, he had converted to Islam (Casciani, 2013).

### 4.3 CONTACT TO RECRUITING AGENCIES

It is a proven fact that friends and (radical/delinquent) peer-groups are an essential factor that fosters radicalisation (Eilers et al., 2015). Adolescents try to find social recognition and acceptance. Furthermore, if their family cannot or is not willing to provide this, the adolescents are looking somewhere else. Most of the time, they find recognition and acceptance within their peer groups. Nevertheless, some will also be prone to recruiting agencies, especially when these agencies promise what the teenagers dream of. However, there are peer groups that provide a delinquent or even radicalised environment or make contact to radical groups. This could promote radicalisation as well.

As mentioned before, there is research that proves the link between radical/delinquent peer groups and radicalisation. However, there is little research on how the extremist got involved with the radical (peer) group. Sageman (2004) offers two possible ways on how the involvement could take place: (1.) All friends radicalise together or (2.) the person is specifically looking for a radicalised group. Olsen (2009) is one of the few researchers who investigates the recruitment through recruitment agencies. He reports that most extremists are not recruited by a charismatic leader or an ideological preacher. They have already been in contact with sympathisers of the radical group or the former extremists visited meetings or events where radicals participated (Olsen, 2009). The survey of BKA, BfV and HKE (2015) supports these results. The data shows that the contact to the Islamist/Salafist scene (e.g. contacts to radical mosques, distribution of the Koran) was an important step towards. Furthermore, the study "Everyday experiences and settings of refugees in Lower Saxony" which was conducted at the Criminological Institute of Lower Saxony in 2016 examines if and how often political or religious groups have tried to contact the respondents. In addition, the respondents could distinguish if they have ever been contacted, if they have been contacted on their way to Germany or in Germany. 12.5 % of the respondents report that they have ever made this experience. Merely, 1.2 % respondents who have ever experienced the any kind of recruitment were contacted in Germany (own calculations).

However, the contact with recruitment agencies does not have to be offline all the time. The internet, social media (e.g. Facebook, Twitter, YouTube) or blogs are one of the biggest spots where recruitment takes place. Propaganda, Islamist thoughts and ideas are spread easily and fast. The contact to sympathisers and the recruitment of new members (mostly vulnerable adolescents) is simple, straightforward and fast.

The following paragraph highlights the background of a few terrorists who radicalised by being in contact with a recruitment agency or by being involved in the Islamist/Salafist scene.

- Mohammad Sidique Khan was born in Leeds (UK) in 1974. He has three older siblings and grew up in Beest. His father was one of the first generations of Pakistanis who came to Yorkshire. Sidique Khan finished high school and started to work in a youth project. Later he met an active recruiting member of the Jihadism network Hassan Butt. Sidique Khans contact to the Jihadism scene was intensified, why he was shown in a video with Aiman al-Sawahiri (Al-Qaeda) before he attacked the metro in London (Malik, 2007).
- Safia Schmitter was born in Hannover, Germany in 2001. She had contact to a Salafism preacher Pierre Vogel when she was seven years old. Later, she attacked in the name of ISIS a police officer in the central train station in Hannover, Germany, with a knife and will be arrested (verdict: six years juvenile detention) ("Safia S.: Die Radikalisierung einer Jugendlichen," 2017).
- Khuram Shazad Butt, one of the three identified offenders of the London Bridge attack in June, 2017, stayed in contact during his radicalisation process with Anjem Choudary, who has been linked to recruitment of terrorism suspects ("London Bridge attacker named as Khuram Butt", (n.d.)).

#### 4.4 SOCIAL BACKGROUND

Bakker (2011) analysed the cases of 335 persons who had been involved in 65 terrorist at-tacks or attempted attacks in Europe between 2001 and 2009. He only considered cases where convictions had been secured or where attackers died during the attack. Bakker argues that studying the characteristics of the jihadi terrorists in the European sample leads to one obvious finding, that is, there is no standard jihadi terrorist in Europe. Bakker's sample included very young people as well as persons in their forties and fifties. Some have no education, while others finished university. Nonetheless, there are a number of, more or less, common traits. A clear majority were from Arab countries and have roots especially in North Africa (mainly Algeria and Morocco). Many of these first, second or third generation immigrants also came from the lower strata of society. A relatively high number of persons had a criminal record; at least a fifth of the sample. Finally, it should be noted that almost all jihadi terrorists in Europe are male, and that many of them relate to each other through kinship or friendship.

However, other researchers and commentators have more insistent that recent patterns of terrorist recruitment in Europe do have, at least to some degree, a discernible pattern regarding the social background of new recruits. Basra et al. (2016, p. 26) state that “rather than in universities or among religious students, the Islamic state increasingly finds recruits in European ghettos, in prisons, as well as among the European ‘under-classes’ and those who have previously engaged in violence and other illegal acts”. While it may seem contradictory that the jihadist narrative can at once offer redemption and at the same time legitimise crime, the influential radical cleric Anwar al-Awlaki instructed his followers that stealing from enemies to further the cause of jihad is not only permitted but also obligatory. This instruction therefore offers the criminal redemption while encouraging their criminal behaviour. Another prominent example was Brussels based radical Khalid Zerkani, a street criminal who was also an Islamic State recruiter. He directed young Moroccan men in Brussels to commit crime and collected the proceeds to contribute towards extremist causes and activities. Zerkani is considered one of the most influential European based recruiters for Islamic State and was responsible for the mobilisation of 72 foreign fighters. Rather than jihadists actively targeting criminally involved people for recruitment, the rather more depressing truth is that both criminals and jihadists are recruited from the same demographic milieu and often in the same places. Basra et al. (2016, p. 30) conclude that “many assumptions about radicalisation need to be reconsidered, e.g. that a pious person is not likely to be also a criminal or that someone ‘acting like a gangster’ cannot possibly be also involved in terrorism”.

The far-right English Defence League (EDL) draws its support mostly from the deprived pockets of British society. Historically, the same pattern is evident in the support base of the British National Party, an older political grouping that has an explicitly racist agenda. Jackson and Feldman (2011) argue that ultra-nationalism and ultra-patriotism that scapegoats ethnic and religious minorities will only be reduced by empowering local politics to improve the economic and social conditions of disadvantaged communities. Further, there needs to be positive and productive attempts to allow inter-ethnic tensions to be worked out and conflict resolution.

#### **4.5 EDUCATIONAL/PROFESSIONAL BACKGROUND**

Krueger and Maleckova (2003) posit that participation in terrorism may be positively related to an individual’s education and income. Terrorism is a form of political action and engagement and more educated and privileged people are more likely to engage in politics. The time and energy of those at the lower end of the socio economic scale is focused on subsistence



and handling the stresses of low income living, whereas more comfortable individuals have the time, resources and propensity to direct their focus to political matters. Krueger and Maleckova support this claim by stating that their findings support the hypothesis that terrorism is more likely when civil rights are suppressed, supports their stance that terrorism results from political rather than economic injustice. In addition, terrorist organisations prefer more educated operatives who are better able to understand instructions and mix with conventional society in order to successfully carry out operations. The authors argue that there is little direct connection between poverty or education and participation in terrorism. Citing research on Palestinian terrorists, they state that “members of Hezbollah’s militant wing or Palestinian suicide bombers are at least as likely to come from economically advantaged families and have a relatively high level of education as to come from the ranks of economically disadvantaged and uneducated. Similarly, members of the Israeli Jewish Underground who terrorized Palestinian civilians in the 1970s and early 1980s were overwhelmingly well educated and in highly regarded occupations” (Krueger and Maleckova, 2003, p. 141).

Pantucci et al. (2016, p. 6) state that “while it is often assumed that terrorists and lone actors in particular are economically or socially disadvantaged, the literature offers no evidence to support this”. Surveys however have demonstrated that the presence of previous convictions for criminality is significantly higher in lone actor terrorists than in those connected to terrorist organisations. However, while lone actors in particular enjoyed relatively high levels of education and originated from middle class families, their employment records were not too positive. Almost half were unemployed and only a fraction were considered professionals.

Wasmund (1986) studied the life histories of 227 individuals who had been active in the Red Army faction in Germany throughout the 1970s. He found that most were from upper middle class families, enjoyed above standard education, but only 35% had jobs. Amongst his study population there was a higher than normal rate of family breakdown and divorce, however the majority had regular and stable childhoods. Russel and Miller (1977, p. 29) examined the background of actors in 18 terrorist groups, including the Baader-Meinhof gang in Germany, Red Brigades in Italy and the Peoples Liberation Army in Turkey, and found that: “The vast majority of those individuals involved in terrorist activities as cadres or leaders is quite well educated. In fact, approximately two-thirds of those identified terrorists are persons with some university training, university graduates or postgraduate students”.



Lyall (2017) found that among British jihadists travelling to Syria, rates of previous criminality were quite high at 22%, however educational attainment across his sample was also very high with a good representation of undergraduate and postgraduate students. To summarise this complex and diverse range of life histories, personal and characteristics, and motivations that characterise the landscape of modern terrorist actors, Bakker and de Graff (2011) make the following statement: “Al-Qaeda-related offenders were younger and were more likely to be students, seek legitimization from epistemic authority figures, learn through virtual sources and display command and control links. They were less likely to have criminal convictions. Right-wing offenders were more likely to be unemployed and less likely to have any university experience, make verbal statements to friends and family about their intent or beliefs, engage in dry runs or obtain help in procuring weaponry. Single-issue offenders were more likely to be married, have criminal convictions, have a history of mental illness, provide specific pre-event warnings or engage in dry runs. They were less likely to learn through virtual sources or be depicted as being socially isolated”.

#### **4.6 PRISON AND SPIRITUAL WELFARE**

Indoctrination of individuals into extremist and radical causes has been taking place in European prisons for some time and, indeed, actual operational planning has occurred in some cases (Basra et al., 2016). Prisons are environments where radicalised individuals often mix with conventional criminals—except for those in segregation units—and therefore the potential for recruitment, particularly among populations of Muslim male offenders, is significant. There are three salient dynamics at play within prison environments, which make them an ideal place to recruit new members to terrorist and extremist causes (Basra et al., 2016). Firstly, prisons are places of vulnerability where predatory recruiters and agitators can find many distressed and socially isolated young men who may be vulnerable to radicalisation. Incarceration removes the individual from communities of meaning and contact with family and other loved ones is usually very restricted. Many incarcerated offenders, especially first time prisoners, experience a personal crisis as the reality of prison life sets in. The often tense and dangerous prison environment can be (self) segregated along racial, ethnic or religious lines and therefore presents a hostile and tribal social space for the prisoner. New inmates are often both physically and psychologically vulnerable and therefore open to new associations and memberships of social groups as a method to ensure personal safety. In addition, the deep personal crisis of incarceration can make inmates

more open to developing new identities and new belief systems, especially if such new ideas offer a redemptive narrative or theme. From the recruiter's perspective, the prison is an environment full of young and often angry young men who are, to some degree, already desensitised to violence and illegality. They have been in conflict with authorities, are often impulsive and are willing to take risks. Jihadist groups offer such people experiences of power, adventure, provide them with a strong identity, and a sense of rebellion and being anti-establishment. As Basra et al. (2016) state: "From the jihadist's perspective, prisons are the perfect 'breeding ground'".

Secondly, within prisons ordinary criminals and radicalised extremists often mix within the one population thereby creating opportunities for networking and skill transfers. Radical agitators and activists can use the resources of criminal knowledge and networks to gain access to weapons, forged documents, money and safe houses. Within prisons, the criminal and terrorist converge, often to the benefit of the extremists. Finally, reintegration into society, that is, finding employment and accommodation, is notoriously difficult for those individuals who have served prison sentences. The stigma of incarceration and criminal identities has been the subject of criminological research for many decades and the structural obstacles to becoming a productive and law-abiding member of society are numerous and often extremely difficult to overcome. The paucity of services and social support within some jurisdictions, as well as a lack of legislative consideration (such as no 'Spent Convictions' law in Ireland) makes reintegration over the long term a difficult and often arduous process. Released individuals are therefore vulnerable to continued radicalisation by extremist groups who offer a sense of belonging, practical social support, as well as a coherent narrative based on victimhood and resentment that explains their current predicament and offers opportunities for revenge.

- Cherif Kouachi and Amedy Coulibaly, two of the coordinators of the January 2015 attacks in Paris, met in prison a decade earlier. Coulibaly was a conventional criminal who was serving time for assault and theft offences, and was radicalised by Kouachi. The pair became solid friends continued to engage in extremist activities and move in radicalised circles after their release from prison, culminating in the deadly Paris attacks (Chrisafis, 2015).
- The case of Omar el-Hussein is particularly interesting in light of his seemingly legitimate attempts to seek help from social services after his release from prison. Hussein had been a perpetrator of violent crime from his adolescence in Copenhagen and became involved

with radicalised groups while incarcerated. He was released from prison in January 2015 but had no access to probationary support due to a legal technicality; he had an ongoing legal appeal against his convictions. He presented himself at a local municipal centre looking for accommodation and food but was refused assistance. In February 2015, Hussein was one of the principal attackers in the attacks on the Jewish Cultural Centre and Synagogue in Copenhagen (Smith-Spark & Robertson, 2015).

- One of the most high profile examples of the intersection of criminality and extremism is the case of Mohammed Merah who killed seven people, including three Jewish children, in Toulouse in March 2012. While pinpointing the exact moment of his radicalisation is difficult, Merah had a history of extreme violence since his youth, including blinding a teenage girl and severely assaulting his own family members. Merah had been incarcerated on a few occasions as a result of his violence and was a hardened criminal. He was also someone who, evidently, had evolved a moral capacity for brutality as well as a practical efficiency in the use of violence. If men like Merah, with such a pronounced history of violence, are mixing with extremist recruiters in prison environments, the results can only be more proficient and capable terrorist offenders (Alexander & Govan, 2012).

## 5 PREVENTION

To counter radicalisation and terrorism, several approaches are implemented in prevention projects. Especially in the previous years, the prevention of radicalisation and counter terrorism has gained in importance. Several European countries developed targeted approaches to counter radicalisation in the various forms of violent extremism. The following description of the approaches, targeting, and direction of prevention projects gives an overview of the existing gap between the needs and the methods of prevention.

The following analysis presents data collected from 108 projects or programmes across Europe, which focused on extremism, counter radicalisation, and/or de-radicalisation. The analysis is partially presented within the context provided by the case studies in this report detailing the characteristics of offenders (chapter 3).


### 5.1 TECHNICAL DETAILS OF PREVENTION PROJECTS

To give an overview about the technical details of the projects, the following focused on a description of the implementation, funding institutions and the concepts. The most projects are implemented nationwide (37.0 %). Almost 1/3 of the analysed projects are implemented in cities (32.4 %) and 12.0 % in regions (n = 89). They received their funding from programmes and initiatives of Federal Ministries (43.9 %), the government (19.4 %), or other several institutions (36.7 %) (n = 98). Almost seven in ten projects (73.1%) focused an educational assessment in their approach (n = 105).

### 5.2 TARGETS OF PREVENTION PROJECTS

Diagram 1 shows the results of the analysis of the targets of approaches. The descriptions of projects and interventions demonstrate a pronounced focus on young people and young adults (49.1 %). In 1/3 of all cases, the projects focused especially individuals of non-specific group. The third biggest target groups are professionals (30.6 %). The fourth biggest target group is the social environment. To the social environment are families, communities, and peer groups. The percentages vary between 8.3 % and 16.7 %. Radicals, prisoners and refugees, and cyberspace are focused in less than 6 % of all projects. The environment is not focused at all (0 %).

**Diagram 1: Target of approaches of preventing radicalisation in percentages. Multiple choices possible. Own calculations (n = 108).**




### 5.3 OVERVIEW OF AIMS OF PREVENTION PROJECTS

The most important aim of projects to prevent radicalisation is to raise the awareness of the target group (36.1 %). More than 1/3 of the projects would like to raise the awareness by enlightening and explaining about risks of radicalisation and violent extremism. A further aim of preventing projects is to strengthening the youth development (33.3 %) by focussing the critical thinking and strengthening the self-confidence. Less than 1/4 of the preventing projects have set themselves the goal to prevent radicalisation (23.1 %) or to de-radicalise affected people (23.1 %). An important part of the aims of the projects is to enhance the expertise of professionals (16.7 %). Professionals (e.g. social workers, street workers, teachers and law enforcement officials) will educated in recognising processes of changes into extremism, they are able to react appropriately and deal adequately with the situation. Just as frequently, the projects will reach the aim to tackle racism (16.7 %). Other often-mentioned goals of projects are the strengthening of democracy (14.8 %) and the protection of vulnerable people (13.9 %). Furthermore, to have a critical view on the own ideology and to handle with or respect other ideologies is named as an aim in 13.0 % of all projects. Over and above that, preventing projects focused in less than 10 % the building of cohesive communities (8.3 %),

the mitigation of competencies with media (7.4 %), the enhancement of tolerance (7.4 %), the prevention of violence in general (6.5 %), the enhancement of political participation (6.5 %), and the integration of minorities. Less than 5 % of all prevention projects follow the aims of enhancing informal networks (4.6 %), improving intercultural integration (3.7 %), strengthening the communication or exchange between different groups (2.8 %), mitigate identity issues (1.9 %), tackle anti-Semitism (1.9 %), strengthening competencies in general (0.9 %), and identify extremists (0.9 %). It is striking here that none of the analysed projects has formulated the aim of strengthening the effectiveness of local agencies, which could be confronted with target groups of preventing projects (0 %).

**Diagram 2: Aims of project/programme in percentages. Multiple choices possible. Own calculation (n = 108).**




## 5.4 IDEOLOGIES ADDRESSED IN PREVENTION PROJECTS

Ideologies take a main place in the prevention of violent extremism. According to them, the whole strategy of prevention projects is based. In the following diagram 3 is shown, that the focus of the prevention projects is on left wing, right wing and religious extremist's ideologies. The representation show that mainly Islamism and right wing ideologies are addressed (70.4 % and 47.2 %). Similarly often are focussed Salafism and Jihadism

(46.3 % and 46.3 %). Left wing ideologies are focussed in 12.0 % of the projects. Other ideologies (4.6 %) are described such as the prevention of racism and anti-democratic attitudes.<sup>1</sup>

**Diagram 3: Ideologies addressed in prevention projects. Multiple ideologies could be addressed. Own calculation (n = 108).**



## 5.5 TARGET GROUPS

Prevention projects and programs are directed towards selected groups. This makes it possible for them to focus on the special requirements of the group and to orientate themselves accordingly. Furthermore, projects are not directed towards one single group exclusively, rather than the social environment (e.g. families and peer groups). Diagram 4 presented the results of the analysis of the main target groups of preventing radicalisation.

<sup>1</sup> The differentiation according to Islamism, Salafism and Jihadism exist because the prevention projects have made this classification of the addressed ideologies. The analysis therefore described the high diversity within one addressed ideology, especially, within religious extremism.



**Diagram 4: Main target groups of prevention projects in percentages.**  
Own calculation (n = 108).




Diagram 4 presented results of the main target group of preventing radicalisation. It shows that almost 45 % of the projects are directed towards youth and young adults. The second main group is the community (24.1 %). 'Community' includes the citizen and the general population of a region or country. Furthermore, almost every fifth project included the family as an important target group to counter radicalisation (19.4 %). Further target groups are criminal offenders (13.9 %), Muslims (10.2 %), women (5.6 %) and migrants (4.6 %). The group of "others" seem to be the second largest group (32.4 %), indeed, the high number show the high diversity in the targeting focus. In this group, for example, were summarised religious institutions and leaders, police, local authority staff, prison staff, health service staff, further and higher education staff, probation staff, mosques, relatives (not clearly described), sport clubs, foster care, residential care, youth clubs.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>2</sup> The target groups have a high diversity. The main groups which could clearly be defined are presented in diagram 4.

## 6 RESULTS

### 6.1 THE ROLE OF INTERNET AND MEDIA

Despite an abundance of literature claiming the significance of the internet in processes of radicalisation into violent extremism, significant gaps are still present in the way the internet and media is addressed by prevention tools. The results show that only 1.9 % of prevention measures target the internet and media. As demonstrated in several of the case studies, the internet is being increasingly used by individuals not only to self-radicalise but also for recruitment and the dissemination of terrorist material. Therefore, it is surprising to see that measures have not intensified in the way in which this is deterred. Moreover, programmes and projects often mentioned the importance of improving media literacy in order to raise awareness and empower individuals to deal with extremist views found online. In our sample of 108 interventions, only 7.4 % specifically developed a response that strengthened the resilience of individuals to online radicalisation.

Clearly more projects should explicitly address extremist narratives and provide the means to off-balance the availability of illegal terrorist material online. With advances in technology and its increasing use from younger age groups, prevention measures should focus on developing media responsibility with children through education and online courses in order to safeguard individuals from extremist behaviour and beliefs online.

### 6.2 VULNERABLE GROUPS

Vulnerable groups are focused little on by prevention measures, particularly in the case of refugees (2.8 %). This could be partially because the ways in which individuals are being radicalised is still not fully understood. Refugees are seen as a vulnerable group given that most seek refuge from war zones, having experienced traumatic events such as the death of family members and friends (Wright & Hankins, 2016). The relationship between mental illness like post-traumatic stress and the risk of radicalisation remains relatively unexplored, despite evidence of this playing a role. We highlight the importance of further research on exploring mental illness as a potential risk factor of radicalisation.

Thus, we would argue that prevention measures should explore the improved collaboration with health care staff who are in the best position to

not only identify mental health vulnerability but also provide treatment, with the help of social workers.

### **6.3 CONTACT TO RECRUITING AGENCIES**

There is little research on how former extremists get involved with radical groups or recruitment agencies. Olsen (2009) reports that most extremists have not been recruited by a charismatic leader or an ideological preacher. They have already been in contact with sympathisers of the radical group. Consequently, it is difficult for prevention projects to intervene. However, studies show that vulnerable people are attracted to extremist beliefs. Therefore, de-radicalisation projects should strengthen youth development, democracy and protecting vulnerable groups. A few projects realise these aims. For example, just 13.9 % of the examined projects focus on protecting vulnerable groups. Clearly, more projects have to address the mentioned aims.

However, peers are an essential factor that fosters radicalisation. Peer groups are very important during the process of growing. They provide recognition, acceptance and support. Furthermore, friends are usually the first persons who recognise whether a member of the group sympathise with radical/extremist ideas and thoughts or become radical. Therefore, friends are the ones who could and should intervene. Conversely, peer groups/friends could be bad company as well. For example if using drugs, justifying and using violence or having radical views are favoured within the group. Besides, friends could make contacts to radical/extremist groups. Consequently, prevention programmes should target peer-groups. Then, projects should support and educate peer groups by equipping them with the knowledge about democracy, extremism, religious identity and possible counselling services. Furthermore, peers should be educated on how to deal with radicalised peers or those at risk.

The analysis of the selected projects show that almost one-half focus on young people and young adolescents. However, just 8.3 % of the examined projects focus on peer groups in particular. There are definitively not enough projects. As mentioned before, peers are usually the first persons who recognise a change. In addition, the analysis of the project show that raising awareness and strengthening democracy are some of the main aims implemented by projects. However, these approaches are not meant for peers in particular. Besides, almost no projects focus on enhancing civil courage or strengthening competencies.

## 6.4 SOCIAL BACKGROUND

Previous research demonstrates that social background is one important factor for radicalisation. Bakker (2011), Basra et al. (2016) and Feldman (2011) summed up in the definition of social background as the strata in the society, the criminal record, the educational background, and the migration background. Thus, different impact factors have an influence on the radicalisation process. Therefore, one challenge of the prevention of radicalisation should be the identification of the individual social backgrounds of vulnerable people.

The description of targets of prevention approaches show, that only 1/3 of all analysed projects focus the individual level. More frequently (49.1 %), a general approach is adopted which is intended to address in particular the group of young people and young adults (see figure 1). If it is assumed that the analysis of individual backgrounds should take a more important role in the prevention of radicalisation, prevention projects could strengthen the analysis of the individual level.

Furthermore, the focus on smaller individual groups (e.g. prisoners, refugees or radicals) could be identified in general as a gap in the prevention landscape. The analysed projects follow different approaches in which the individual background of prisoners (5.6 %) or other vulnerable groups (refugees: 2.8 %) remains almost unseen.

## 6.5 EDUCATIONAL/PROFESSIONAL BACKGROUND

Promoting education is commonly mentioned as one of the best prevention measures to protect individuals, particularly young adults and teenagers, against the risk factors of radicalisation (Aly, Taylor & Karnovsky, 2014). Schools have a key role here given their opportunity at reaching masses of young people. Although education systems across Europe vary in structure, standards and national curriculums, academic and professional staff have equal possibilities in ensuring that common values are installed in pupils to prevent extremist and violent attitudes from emerging. In particular, teachers are well placed to be able recognise when pupils are behaving differently. Given their potential at recognising early signs of radicalisation, educators and educational organisation should be addressed in prevention measures.

Many policy approaches have developed projects and interventions that better equip the educator's ability at identifying radicalisation and in encouraging the cultural and social development of pupils, for example through lesson plans that explore different faiths and beliefs and that promote common and democratic values. This is well reflected in our results,

which indicates supporting youth development as the second highest aim (33.3 %) of prevention measures in our sample. This would suggest that existing tools recognise the importance of fostering a better understanding in young populations of how democracy works and building the resilience of young people to hate speech and discrimination, such as xenophobia and racism. As young groups were the highest targeted population (44.4 %), it would suggest that current prevention measures pursue strategies that create a progressive change through developing young individuals in their social and emotional capacity. Such long-term initiatives are critical in addressing those factors of radicalisation that build up over time. Considering as radicalisation is often seen a progressive change (King & Taylor, 2011), it could be argued that further programmes should address changing attitudes in a similar progressive form.

## 6.6 PRISON AND SPIRITUAL WELFARE

As radicalisation in prison systems is a new phenomenon, knowledge and data on how individuals are radicalised in prison is somewhat limited. Cases of prisoners becoming radicalised are finite and their exposure to extremist content is comparatively restricted. Given the relatively small occurrence of prisoner radicalisation, the same can be observed in the focus it has received in prevention measures. Results from our sample reveal that as little as 13.9% of prevention efforts are targeted towards the offender population, inclusive of the prison environment.

The prison population, however, is becoming increasingly recognised as a breeding ground for radicalisation and should therefore be sufficiently reflected in prevention programmes and interventions. For example, nearly 5 percent of all prisoners in Belgium are believed to pose a radicalisation threat as of 2017 (Counter Extremism Project, 2017). Although results show that prisons have to some extent been addressed by counter-radicalisation interventions, more developments in prevention are needed to lessen the threat of Islamic extremism in prison populations. Suggested approaches include the introduction of Islamic counselling to strengthen the spiritual identity of prisoners.

## 7 SUMMARY AND OUTLOOK

Countering online-radicalisation is still underdeveloped in Europe and is the explicit aim of only 1.9 % of prevention measures. Given the impact the internet has in all aspects of radicalisation, an increased number of prevention measures targeting online radicalisation should be established.

The relationship between mental illness and the risk of radicalisation requires further research. Improved collaborations with healthcare staff provide a potential key role in identifying risk factors of radicalisation.

Research has suggested that vulnerable groups are more susceptible to becoming radicalised and targeted by terrorist groups for recruitment. However, only 13.9 % of prevention measures in our sample were aimed at protecting vulnerable groups. In particular, only 2.8 % of the measures identified in our sample were aimed at refugees. More prevention measures targeting groups vulnerable to radicalisation and the factors affecting recruitment are required.

The predominant focus of approaches of prevention projects is prevention of radicalisation in general undetermined groups (young people: 49.1 %). Previous research has shown that the identification of specific grievances in individuals' social backgrounds can be an important factor in radicalisation processes and, therefore, more focus should be brought onto social background.

Promoting the development of young people was the second highest (33.3 %) aim and young populations were the most targeted group (44.4 %) in our sample. This would indicate that fostering democratic values and resilience has been recognised as an important approach to curbing the onset of radicalisation.

The threat of radicalisation within prison populations is growing. The number of extremist behaviours highlighted in prison systems are rather low, which is reflected in the limited focus it has received in prevention measures, which is 13.8 %. Challenging extremist behaviours is critical across all vulnerable populations and so increasing the amount of measures combating radicalisation in connection to prison populations should be reinforced.

## APPENDIX

**Table 2: Overview of terror attacks (right-wing/left-wing/Islamism) in Germany**

DAY OF ATTACK	FORM OF EXTREMISM	APPLICATION	GOAL	NUMBERS OF DEATH PEOPLE	NUMBERS OF INJURED PEOPLE	IDENTIFIED/ POSSIBLE OFFENDER
02.04.1968	Left-wing (RAF)	Arson	Warehouse	0	0	Horst Söhnlein
11.05.1972	Left-wing (RAF)	Explosive device	US-Soldiers	1	13	Gerhard Müller
24.05.1972	Left-wing (RAF)	Car bomb	US-Soldiers	3	5	Andreas Baader, Holger Klaus Meins, Jan-Carl Raspe, Gudrun Ensslin, Brigitte Mohnhaupt and other
05.09.1972	Palestinian terror organisation "Black September"	Hostage taking	Olympic Games in Munich	17	Unknown	Atef Bseiso, Abu Daoud, Jamal Al-Gashey, Mohammed Boudia, Ali Hassan Salameh
30.04.1977	Left-wing ("Rote Zora")	Explosive device	Building of the German Medical Association in Berlin	0	0	Andreas Baader
26.09.1980	Right-wing (Gundolf Köhler)	Explosive device	Oktoberfest in Munich	13	211	Gundolf Köhler
03.11.1982	Left-wing ("Devrimci Sol")	Firearms	Turkish Consul General in Cologne	0	0	Group "Devrimci Sol"
07.01.1984	Right-wing/catholic-fundamentalist	Petrol	Discotheque "Liverpool" in Munich	1	8	Wolfgang Abel, Marco Furlan
04./05.04.1986	Unknown	Bomb	Discotheque "La Belle" in Berlin	3	> 200	Wolfgang Abel, Marco Furlan
01.03.1988	Left-wing (Action Directe)	Arson	Renault agricultural machinery branch	0	0	Unknown/Action Directe
17.09.-23.09.1991	Right-wing (500 persons)	different	Accommodation of refugees (Hoyerswerda)	unknown	32	Unknown
31.01.1992	Right-wing	Arson	Accommodation of refugees (Lampertheim)	3	unknown	3 young, unknown persons
14.03.1992	Right-wing (40 teenager)	Unknown	Accommodation of refugees (Saal)	1	unknown	40 young unknown persons

DAY OF ATTACK	FORM OF EXTREMISM	APPLICATION	GOAL	NUMBERS OF DEATH PEOPLE	NUMBERS OF INJURED PEOPLE	IDENTIFIED/ POSSIBLE OFFENDER
22.08.1992	Right-wing	Arson and other	Accommodation of refugees (Rostock-Lichtenhagen)	Unknown	unknown	Unknown
23.11.1992	Right-wing	Arson	Two houses of Turkish families	3	unknown	Michael P., Lars C.
27.03.1993	Left-wing (RAF)	Explosive device	Jail in Weiterstadt	0	0	3 unknown men and one unknown women
29.05.1993	Right-wing	Arson	Two family house	5	17	Four unknown youth persons
18.01.1996	Unknown	Arson	Accommodation of refugees (Lübeck)	10	unknown	Not explained
16.07.2000	Right-wing	Arson	Accommodation of refugees (Ludwigshafen- Oppau)	0	3	-
27.07.2000	Right-wing	Pipe bomb	Tram station	1	10	-
19.01.2001	Right-wing (NSU)	Explosive device	German-Iranian shop	0	1	Uwe Mundlos
09.06.2004	Right-wing (NSU)	Explosive device (nail-bomb)	Parade	0	22	Uwe Böhnhardt
31.07.2006	Islamic extremism	Attempted bomb attacks	Two trains	0	0	-
06.01.2007	Right-wing	Molotov cocktails	Accommodation of refugees (Sangershausen)	0	3	-
02.02.2007	Right-wing	Assassination with fire-arm	One Tunisian man in a supermarket	1	0	-
02.03.2011	Islamic-extremism	Assassination with fire-arm	US-Soldiers	2	2	-
17.09.2015	Islamic-extremism	Knife attack	Police officer	1	1	-
07.10.2015	Right-wing	Knife attack	Politician (Henriette Reker)	0	1	Frank S.
26.02.2016	Islamic-extremism	Knife attack	Police officers	0	1	Safia Schmitter
16.04.2016	Islamic-extremism	Explosive device	Gurdwara (Sikh religion)	0	3	-
18.07.2016	Islamic-extremism	Axe, knife	Train traveller	1 (assassin)	5	-



DAY OF ATTACK	FORM OF EXTREMISM	APPLICATION	GOAL	NUMBERS OF DEATH PEOPLE	NUMBERS OF INJURED PEOPLE	IDENTIFIED/ POSSIBLE OFFENDER
24.06.2016	(Islamic-extremism)	Backpack bomb	Visitors of a festival	1 (assassin)	15	Ali S.
27.09.2016	Right-wing	Explosive devices	Mosque and international congress centre	0	0	-
25.10.2016	Right-wing ("Reichsbürger")	Explosive devices	Syrian large family	0	12	-
19.12.2016	Islamic-extremism	Truck, firearms	Visitors of the Christmas market	12	55	Anis Amri

Sources: "Terror in Europa – wo Anschläge verübt wurden," 2011. Retrieved from <http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/chronologie-terroranschlaege-in-europa-1.1123846> [14.08.2017]. "Islamistische Terroranschläge in Europa," (n.d.). Retrieved from [http://www.politische-bildung.de/islamistischer\\_terror\\_europa.html](http://www.politische-bildung.de/islamistischer_terror_europa.html) [14.08.2017]. "Liste von Terroranschlägen" (n.d.). Retrieved from [https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liste\\_von\\_Terroranschlaegen](https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liste_von_Terroranschlaegen) [08.08.2017].

**Table 3: Overview of terror attacks (right-wing/left-wing/Islamism) in United Kingdom**

DAY OF ATTACK	FORM OF EXTREMISM	APPLICATION	GOAL	NUMBERS OF DEATH PEOPLE	NUMBERS OF INJURED PEOPLE	IDENTIFIED/ POSSIBLE OFFENDER
12.01.1971	Anarchist communism	Explosive devices	House of government minister Robert Carr	0	0	-
31.10.1971	IRA	Explosive devices	Post office tower	0	0	-
22.02.1972	IRA	Car bomb	Headquarters mess (British army base)	7	19	Noel Jenkins
19.09.1972	Palestinensien terror organisation: Black September Organisation (BSO)	Letter bomb Bombs posted in: Israel (14), London (8), Ottawa (6), Argentina (5), Vienna (5), New York (3), Geneva (3), Kinshasa (3), Paris (2), Montreal (1), Brussels (1),	Israeli embassy in London	1	0	unknown

DAY OF ATTACK	FORM OF EXTREMISM	APPLICATION	GOAL	NUMBERS OF DEATH PEOPLE	NUMBERS OF INJURED PEOPLE	IDENTIFIED/ POSSIBLE OFFENDER
08.03.1973	'Provisional' IRA	4 Car bombs, explosive devices	Outside the 'Old Bailey' and government's agriculture department headquarters	1	>150	unknown
10.09.1973	'Provisional' IRA	Explosive devices	London's King's Cross and Euston stations	0	21	unknown
04.02.1974	'Provisional' IRA	Explosive devices	a bus carrying British soldiers and several of their family members	12	38	unknown
17.06.1974	IRA	Explosive devices	Houses of parliament	0	11	unknown
05.10.1974	'Provisional' IRA	Explosive devices	Guildford Pub,	5	65	unknown
22.10.1974	'Provisional' IRA	Explosive devices	Brook's gentlemen club	0	3	unknown
07.11.1974	'Provisional' IRA	Explosive devices	Pub in Woolwich (London)	2	28	unknown
14.11.1974	'Provisional' IRA	Explosive devices	Coventry telephone exchange	1	0	James Patrick McDade
21.11.1974	'Provisional' IRA	Explosive devices	Two pubs in Birmingham	21	182	Alleged perpetrator: Michael Hayes
18.12.1974	'Provisional' IRA	Explosive devices	Bristol's most popular shopping districts	0	17	unknown
27.08.1975	'Provisional' IRA	Explosive devices	Pub, frequented by British military personnel	0	33	unknown
05.09.1975	'Provisional' IRA	Explosive devices	lobby of the Hilton Hotel	2	63	unknown
18.11.1975	'Provisional' IRA	Explosive devices	Walton's restaurant	2	23	unknown
27.11.1975	'Provisional' IRA	Gun	TV presenter Ross McWhirter (North London)	1	unknown	unknown
06.-12.12.1975	'Provisional' IRA	-	IRA members barricaded themselves in a flat and held two occupants hostage	0	2	unknown
20.12.1975	Ulster Defence Association (UDA)	Explosive devices	Biddy Mulligan's pub (London)	0	5	unknown

DAY OF ATTACK	FORM OF EXTREMISM	APPLICA-TION	GOAL	NUM-BERS OF DEATH PEOPLE	NUM-BERS OF INJURED PEOPLE	IDENTIFIED/ POSSIBLE OFFENDER
17.12.1978	'Provisional' IRA	Explosive devices	Maggs department store	0	7	unknown
17.01.1979	-	Explosive devices	Texaco oil terminal on Canvey Island	0	0	unknown
17.02.1979	Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF)	Explosive devices	Two pubs frequented by Catholics in Glasgow, Scotland	-	-	unknown
30.03.1979	Irish National Liberation Army (INLA)	Car bomb	Airey Neave (politician)	1	0	unknown
30.04.1980	Iranian Arab	Siege	Iranian Embassy in London	2	unknown	unknown
10.10.1981	IRA	Explosive devices	Outside Chelsea Barracks	2	39	unknown
26.10.1981	IRA	Explosive devices	Wimpy Bar, London	1	Unknown	unknown
14.03.1982	South African security police	Explosive devices	African National Congress (ANC) in London	0	1	General Johann Coetzee (former head), Craig Williamson, John McPherson, Roger Raven, Wybrand du Toit, John Adam, James Taylor and Eugene de Kock
20.07.1982	'Provisional' IRA	Explosive devices	British military ceremonies	11	c. 50	unknown
17.12.1983	'Provisional' IRA	Car bomb	Harrods department store	6	90	unknown
12.10.1984	'Provisional' IRA	A long-delay time bomb	Grand Brighton Hotel	5	31	unknown
21.12.1988	<i>two Libyan nationals</i>	Explosive devices	Pan Am Flight 103	270	0	Unknown ( <i>Gaddafi accepted responsibility and paid compensation</i> )
03.08.1989	Unknown	Explosive devices	Preparing a bomb	1	unknown	Mustafa Mahmoud Mazeh
22.09.1989	'Provisional' IRA	Explosive devices	Royal Marines base in Deal, Kent.	11	22	unknown
16.05.1990	'Provisional' IRA	Explosive devices/car bomb	Minibus with passengers	1	1	unknown

DAY OF ATTACK	FORM OF EXTREMISM	APPLICATION	GOAL	NUMBERS OF DEATH PEOPLE	NUMBERS OF INJURED PEOPLE	IDENTIFIED/ POSSIBLE OFFENDER
01.06.1990	'Provisional' IRA	Gun attack	Lichfield City railway station, Staffordshire	1	1	unknown
20.07.1990	'Provisional' IRA	Explosive devices	London Stock Exchange	0	0	unknown
07.02.1991	'Provisional' IRA	Explosive devices	10 Downing Street, London	0	4	Unknown
18.02.1991	'Provisional' IRA	Explosive devices	Victoria Station	1	38	Unknown
15.11.1991	'Provisional' IRA	Explosive devices	St Albans city centre	2	0	Patricia Black and Frankie Ryan
28.02.1991	'Provisional' IRA	Explosive devices	London Bridge station	0	29	unknown
10.04.1992	'Provisional' IRA	Explosive devices/truck bomb	Outside the Baltic Exchange building	3	91	unknown
07.06.1992	'Provisional' IRA	Gun attack	Routine traffic control	1	0	Paul Magee
25.08.1992	'Provisional' IRA	Three fire-bombs/ Explosive devices	Shoplatch, The Charles Darwin Centre and Shrewsbury Castle	0	0	unknown
12.10.1992	Unknown	Explosive devices	Toilet of a pub in Covent Garden	1	4	unknown
03.12.1992	'Provisional' IRA	Explosive devices/car bomb	Central Manchester	0	65	unknown
20.03.1993	'Provisional' IRA	Explosive devices	Outside shops in Warrington, Cheshire	2	>50	unknown
24.04.1993	'Provisional' IRA	Explosive devices/truck bomb	City of London at Bishopsgate.	1	>40	unknown
9./11./13.03.1994	'Provisional' IRA	Explosive devices	Heathrow Airport	0	0	Unknown
26-27.07.1994	Palestinensien group	Explosive devices/car bombs	London	0	20	unknown
09.02.1996	'Provisional' IRA	Explosive devices	London Docklands	2	>100	Unknown
18.02.1996	'Provisional' IRA	Explosive devices	Aldwych in central London	1	8	Edward O'Brien

DAY OF ATTACK	FORM OF EXTREMISM	APPLICATION	GOAL	NUMBERS OF DEATH PEOPLE	NUMBERS OF INJURED PEOPLE	IDENTIFIED/ POSSIBLE OFFENDER
15.06.1996	'Provisional' IRA	Explosive devices/truck bomb	Central Manchester	0	200	unknown
17./24./30./4. 1999	Neo-Nazi militant/right wing	Explosive devices/nail bombs	Soho, Brixton and Brick Lane	3	139	David Copeland (Copeland, 24, a disaffected loner, sexually confused and driven by homophobia, Nazism and deep-seated racism)
20.09.2000	Real Irish Republican Army (RIRA)	Rocket launcher attack	MI6 Headquarters, London	0	0	Unknown
04.03.2001	RIRA	Explosive devices	outside the BBC Television Centre in London	0	1	Unknown
03.04.2001	RIRA	Explosive devices	Ealing, London	0	7	unknown
04.11.2001	RIRA	Explosive devices/car bomb	Birmingham	Unknown	Unknown	Unknown
07.07.2005	Islamist extremists	Suicide bomb attacks	London	56 (incl. 4 bombers)	784	Hasib Hussain, Mohammad Sidique Khan, Germaine Lindsay, Shehzad Tanweer
Jan.-Feb. 2007	Anti-authoritarianism	A 7 letter bomb campaign	Various companies and agencies	0	8	Miles Cooper
30.06.2007	Islamist extremists	Explosive devices/car bomb	Glasgow Airport	1	5	Bilal Abdullah and Kafeel Ahmed
22.05.2008	Islamist extremists	Explosive devices/nail bomb	Giraffe cafe and restaurant in Princesshay, Exeter	0	1 (attacker)	Mohamed Abdulaziz Rashid Saeed-Alim (Nicky Reilly)
29.04.-12.07.2013	Right-wing extremist	Knife attack/explosive devices/nail bombs	Knife attack against outside a mosque in Walsall, a mosque in Wolverhampton, a mosque in Tipton	1	unknown	Pavlo Lapshyn (Ukrainian student and right-wing extremist)
22.05.2013	Islamist extremists	Attempted decapitation	Woolwich, Royal Borough of Greenwich	1	unknown	Michael Adebolajo and Michael Adebowale

DAY OF ATTACK	FORM OF EXTREMISM	APPLICATION	GOAL	NUMBERS OF DEATH PEOPLE	NUMBERS OF INJURED PEOPLE	IDENTIFIED/ POSSIBLE OFFENDER
05.12.2015	Islamist extremists	Knife attack	Leytonstone Tube Station in East London	0	3	Muhaydin Mire
16.06.2016	Right-wing	Fire arm shooting, stabbing	Market street, Bir-stall, West Yorkshire	1	1	Thomas Mair
22.03.2017	Islamist extremists	Vehicle-ramming attack, stabbing	in the vicinity of the Palace of Westminster in London,	6	49	Khalid Masood
22.05.2017	Islamist extremists	Suicide bomb	Manchester Arena	22	250	Salmen Abedi
03.06.2017	Islamist extremists	Vehicle-ramming attack, suicide attack	London Bridge and Borough Market area London	11	48	huras Shazad Butt, Rachid Redouane, Youssef Zaghba
19.06.2017	Islamist extremists	Vehicle-ramming attack	near the Muslim Welfare House	1 (offender)	10	Darren Osborne
15.09.2017	Islamist extremists	underground attack	Parsons Green tube station, London	0	30	unknown

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